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The Appellant, Board of Education of the Jordan School District (the "School
District"), respectfully submits this brief in reply to the Appellee's Brief.
VRGUMENT
A. THE PROHIBITION AGAINSI CHARGING FEES TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS
IS NOT LIMITED TO INITIAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT.
Section 10-9-106(2)(c), Utah Code Ann. provides that:
A school district is subject to a municipality's land use regulations under this
chapter, except that a municipality may not: *** (c) require a district to pay fees not
authorized by this section.
On its face, this statute prohibits a municipality from charging a fee to a school district
unless it is expressly authorized by § 10-9-106. In the Appellee's Brief, Sandy City admits
that its storm drain fee constitutes a "fee" with the meaning of § 10-9-106. (Appellee's Brief
at 7, n.2.) Unless the fee is authorized by this section, i.e., § 10-9-106, a municipality cannot
require a school district to pay it. Sandy City argues that the limitation on fees in § 10-9106(2)(c) does not apply to all fees, but only to initial land development fees because this
statute is part of the Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act (the "Act").
(Appellee's Brief at 9-10.) However, this argument should not be accepted for several
reasons.
*. i his Court Must Interpret § 10-9-106(2)(c) In a Way That Does Not Render
It Superfluous. It is a primary rule of statutory construction that "requires a statute to be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
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superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another." Redeker
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 585 (UtahApp.1998), quoting, Brickyard Homeowners
Association Management Committee v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983).
The statutory construction suggested by Sandy City would render § 10-9-106(2)(c) entirely
superfluous and inoperative. Indeed, there would be virtually no fee whatsoever that would
be prohibited from being charged to a school district by that section. Sandy City argues that
the legislature did not intend that "the limitation in § 10-9-106(2)(c) be extracted from its
context and broadly applied to prohibit a municipality from charging fees other than those
specified in that subsection, including utility fees." (Appellee's Brief at 10). However, such
an interpretation renders subsection 106(2)(c) entirely meaningless. If the prohibition must
be stated in subsection (2)(c) of § 10-9-106 then it can never prohibit any fees. The other
subsections of § 10-9-106(2) expressly prohibit specific fees. However, subsection (2)(c) of
§ 10-9-106 is not a specific but a general prohibition against all other fees unless "authorized
by this section." If the prohibition against a fee must be specifically stated in the statute, then
the general prohibition against charging fees in § 10-9-106(2)(c) plays no role because it
cannot possibly apply to any fee.
2. The Limitation On Fees in § 10-9-106(2)(c) Is Not Limited To Development
Fees, Sandy City also argues that § 10-9-106(2)(c) can be read only to prohibit "land use
development fees" such as site plan approval and building permit fees, but cannot be read to
"prohibit a municipality from charging any fees other than those specified in that subsection,
2

including utility fees." (Appellee's Brief at 10.) However, such a reading of § 10-9106(2)(c) disregards the express language of the statute: "a municipality may not...require
a district to pay fees not authorized by this section." Although the Legislature could have
easily specified that it had only initial land use development fees in mind, there is absolutely
nothing in the statute that limits the fees prohibited by § 10-9-106(2)(c) to "land use
development fees." In context, the fees prohibited are all fees not authorized by § 10-9106(2)(c). Section 10-9-106(1) defines the circumstances in which it applies: "when
installing, constructing, operating or otherwise using any areay land or building situated
within the municipality." The use and operation of any area, land or building is much
broader than initial land use development fees. It extends to a fee for any operation or use of
land by the School District.
Moreover, the prohibition against charging fees not authorized by this section entails
in its plain language precisely the opposite of what Sandy City argues. That is, this statute
prohibits fees to be charged unless they are expressly set forth in § 10-9-106. It does not
permit fees unless they are expressly prohibited as Sandy City urges.
Sandy City overlooks the fact that the provisions of the Act relate not merely to initial
land use development, but also to ongoing land use and management. Section 10-9-102 of
the Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act describes the purposes of the
Act to apply not merely to initial construction and development, but to the use of land on a
permanent and on-going basis:
3

To accomplish the purposes of this chapter and in order to provide for the
health, safety and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of the municipality in its present and
future inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, secure economy in
governmental expenditures, foster the State's agricultural and other industries, protect
both urban and non-urban development, and to protect property values, municipalities
may enact all the ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for
the use and development of land within the municipality, including ordinances,
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces, structures, buildings,
energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, transportation and public or alternative
transportation, infrastructure, publicfacilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping,
unless those ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law.
Note that a broad authority is given to municipalities to enact statutes related to the
"use and development" of land in the broadest sense. The purpose of the statute is not
limited to defining the conditions of initial land development and building construction only.
The ordinances and purposes of the Act extend beyond initial land development construction
to "all uses," "structures," "buildings," "infrastructure," and whatever will "promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics
of the municipality."

However, this broad grant of authority is limited where the

"ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law." Section 10-9-106(2)(c)
is such a prohibition.
B. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN § 10-9-106(2)(c) AND § 17A-3-315(l)
UNLESS THESE STATUTES ARE CONSTRUED TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF
STORM DRAIN FEES.
Sandy City argues that there is a conflict between § 17A-3-315(l) and § 10-9-106.
Sandy City apparently believes that such a conflict exists because it reads § 17A-3-315 to
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provide that a municipality can assess "reasonable charges for any services or materials
actually rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public agency, including by way of
example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting, or sewer services." However,
Sandy City overlooks the express limitation in the first sentence of § 17A-3-315(1), which
states:
Except as provided in subsection (2), a municipality may not levy an
assessment against property owned by the federal government, the state of Utah, any
county, school district, municipality or any other political subdivision of the state of
Utah, or by any department or division of any public agency even though such
property is benefitted by improvements made, but each such public agency is
authorized to contract with the municipality for the making of such improvements and
for the payment of costs thereof to the municipality.
On its face, this statute prohibits any assessments against property of a school district.
The second sentence of § 17A-3-315 merely provides that the first sentence should not be
read to prohibit a municipality from imposing on a public agency charges for services or
materials rendered. Section 17A-3-315 merely provides that the right to enter into contracts
to pay for services and materials must not be construed as a prohibition on a municipality
assessing such charges. Section 17A-3-315 is not an independent grant of authority by a
municipality to assess fees for services and materials as Sandy City reads it. The second
sentence of § 17A-3-315(1) begins: "Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from
imposing..." This statute is expressly stating a limitation with respect to the interpretation
of the prohibition on assessments contained in that statute itself. It does not apply to
interpretation of any other statute. Thus, the limitation on interpreting § 17A-3-315(1) to
5

prohibit such charges does not authorize Sandy City to actually make such assessments where
they otherwise violate § 10-9-106(2)(c). However, if § 17A-3-315 is read to require the
School District to pay storm drain fees, then there is a direct conflict between it and § 10-9106(2)(c) because one statute would then require payment and the other would prohibit
payment of monthly storm drain fees.
C. NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY SANDY CITY SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT
THAT SANDY CITY IS ENTITLED TO IMPOSE FEES FOR STORM SEWER
DRAINAGE DESPITE THE PROHIBITION OF § 10-9-106(2)(c).
Sandy City argues that adopting the School District's construction of § 10-9-106(2)(c)
"disrupts established case law addressing school district responsibility for certain types of
fees." (Appellee's Brief at 12.) However, none of the cases cited by Sandy City support the
propositions for which the City cites them. For example, Sandy City cites Salt Lake County
v. Board of Education of Granite School District, 108 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Utah 1991) for
the proposition that "the district is exempt from fees for storm sewer drainage system only
if the fees amount or tax or assessment." (Appellee's Brief, 13.) However, Salt Lake County
v. Board of Education of Granite School District only stands for the proposition that a onetime fee to cover the costs of improvements is an impact fee from which a school district is
not exempt. It does not say that a municipality is authorized to charge any fee unless it is a
tax or assessment. Further, the Granite School District court did not consider the limitation
on a municipality's charging of other fees under § 10-9-106(2)(c).
Sandy City also cites Murray v. Board of Education of Murray City School District,
6

396 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1964) for the proposition that "a fee is charged for a service based
upon benefits conferred, the fee is not an assessment for which the district is exempt."
However, Murray v. Board of Education of Murray City School District stands only for the
proposition that prior to adoption of § 10-9-106(2)(c) a city could collect a sewer services
fee from a school district.
Sandy City cites Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary
District, 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987) for the proposition that "a school district must pay
the fee, even though some of the funds collected are used to finance capital improvements
in the interim." (Appellee's Brief at 13.) However, Ponderosa One does not stand for that
proposition. The Ponderosa One court held merely that sewer service charges are not taxes
and assessments where there is no lien placed on the property to collect the charges in the
event of non-payment.
Sandy City urges the Court to view the history of case law regarding imposition of
fees by municipalities on school districts as one where school districts must inevitably pay
the fees assessed by municipalities. However, because § 10-9-106(2)(c) was enacted after
these cases had been decided, it must be seen as a limitation on a municipality's ability to
charge fees that have previously been permitted.
Section 10-9-106 must be read in conjunction with other prohibitions on fees, taxes,
and assessments by a municipality against a school district. Section 53 A-3-408 provides that
school districts are exempt from taxes and assessments by local government entities. Section
7

53A-20-108(3) expressly provides that: k%A local governmental entity may not increase a
previously agreed-upon fee after the district has signed contracts to begin construction."
Section 53A-20-108(2) provides that a school district must meet with the local governmental
entity "to negotiate any fees that might be charged by the local governmental entity in
connection with a building project." This statutory scheme shows that all fees assessed by
municipalities in the building phase of constructing school buildings must be negotiated.
Further, such fees cannot be raised after construction contracts have been signed. Section
10-9-106(2)(c) provides that any fees not expressly authorized in that section cannot be
charged to a school district. The storm drain fee assessed by Sandy City is not authorized by
§ 10-9-106. It was not negotiated. It raises the amount of fees to be charged to the school
district after construction contracts have been signed. Therefore, it is prohibited.
D. SANDY CITY SEEKS TO IMPERMISSIBLY SPREAD THE COST OF NEW
STORM DRAIN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TO NON-RESIDENTS OF THE
CITY.
Sandy City has misconstrued the School District's argument regarding impact fees.
(Appellee's Brief at 14.) It is not the School District's position that Sandy City's storm drain
fee is really an impact fee. Rather, the statutory scheme set forth in § 10-9-106 and in § 53 A20-108 requires that storm drain fees must be charged as impact fees rather than as monthly
fees.
There are several reasons why the storm drain fee should be charged as an impact fee
rather than as a monthly storm drain fee. First, § 10-9-106(2)(e) expressly permits impact
8

fees to be charged to school districts. However, it requires that such impact fees must be
"reasonably related to the impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is to
address." The present monthly fee charged by Sandy City is not reasonably related to the
impact that building schools has on the need that the improvement addresses because this
particular fee funds new design and construction of storm drains in Sandy City. In addition,
an impact fee must comply with the requirements set forth in § 11-36-201, et seq., Utah Code
Ann. These additional protections against charging fees not directly related to the impact of
building a school on the storm drain system are not provided in Sandy City's storm drain fee
ordinance. (R. 42-48.)
The statutory scheme established in § 10-9-106 provides for fees to be charged to
school districts for storm drains if they meet the requirements of an impact fee. School
districts need these protections to insure that municipalities will not attempt to fund capital
improvements at the expense of the School District and residents of the School District who
reside outside of the municipality.
Sandy City argues that the fee which it has assessed cannot be an impact fee. Impact
fees are "charges levied by local governments against new development in order to generate
revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development." (Appellee's Brief at 15.)
In addition, the City claims that the fee at issue cannot be an "impact fee" because the "City
is not attempting to raise revenue for capital facilities necessitated by new development, but
to provide and improve an existing service available to all property owners." (Appellee's
9

Brief at 16-17.) However, the ordinance at issue expressly provides that the storm drain fee
is intended to fund the design and construction of new capital improvements: "The charges
shall fund the administration, planning, design, construction, water quality programming,
operation, maintenance and repair of existing and future storm water facilities." (R. 45,
Sandy City Ordinance 17-2-6.)
Thus, the purpose of the fee is to charge both for maintaining a system and to
construct new systems by providing for the planning, design, and construction of a future
storm water system. In essence, the monthly fee charged by Sandy City allows Sandy to
spread costs of new construction and capital improvements to residents of Bluffdale,
Herriman, West Jordan, South Jordan, Draper, and unincorporated Salt Lake County without
giving notice to them. It allows Sandy City to spread its fee base to those who are not
residents of the City, but are within the boundaries of the Jordan School District. Indeed, one
of the purposes of § 10-9-106(2)(c) is to prevent municipalities from imposing fees and costs
on school districts either in connection with initial construction of schools or thereafter
unless they are expressly authorized. The purpose of the prohibition is to ensure that the
scarce tax monies which are received by school districts are not used to pay for capital
improvements and development costs which municipalities would seek to impose upon nonresidents of the municipality. Municipalities are highly motivated to impose such fees on
school districts because they can impose additional costs and assessments on citizens who
do not have an opportunity to vote against such fees or against public officials who assess
10

them. The citizens of Bluffdale, Herriman, West Jordan, South Jordan, Draper, and
unincorporated Salt Lake County cannot vote against the elected officials of Sandy City who
seek to impose fees on them to fund new storm drain designs and construction.
Sandy City can in fact recoup the cost of the impact on the existing storm drain system
by appropriately adopting an impact fee. If an impact fee is charged, then the School District
can bond for the cost of the entire project, including the impact fee. In this way, the residents
of the Jordan School District who reside outside of Sandy City can vote for or against the
bond. However, a monthly fee deprives those residents of the Jordan School District who
live outside of Sandy City from having any vote or say in the fees Sandy City imposes on
them.
It is true that the School District has stipulated that the fee in question is not an impact
fee. However, the admission thus made is only that the fee that has been adopted does not
comply with requirements to create a legal impact fee. The School District's position is, in
fact, that the fees that are charged on a monthly basis should be charged as impact fees
because they are intended to raise revenue for the costs of future design and construction.
E. REQUIRING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO PAY THE STORM DRAIN FEE
GIVES SANDY CITY AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT THE GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION.
The underlying purpose for statutes such as § 10-9-106 is to insure that municipalities
cannot impede the essential governmental function fulfilled by school districts, i.e.,
education. However, Sandy City grants itself authority to shut off water to schools in the
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Jordan School District if it fails to pay the storm drain fee. (R. 42.)
Sandy City Ordinance 17-2-7 states: "Pursuant to 10-8-83 Utah Code Ann., the City
may cause water service to the property to be shut off for failure to pay the storm sewer
drainage service furnished, as set forth in the billing." The specter of Sandy City shutting
off water to school children explains why the Legislature considered it essential to prohibit
such fees in § 10-9-106. The prohibition against taxes and assessments is set forth in § 53 A3-408. A municipality has the right to place a lien on property for such taxes and
assessments, and thereby has the right to take property from subdivisions of the state.
Because such an action would disrupt the essential governmental function of school districts,
they are also prohibited. See also, Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. McGonagle,
112 P.401 (Utah 1910); Wey v. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 381 (Utah 1909). Similarly, giving
Sandy City the right to shut off water to schools gives it the power to disrupt education, and
such a power possessed by a municipality should not be countenanced by this Court for the
same reasons that municipalities cannot be granted authority to foreclose on school district
property.
II. CONCLUSION
The straight forward reading of § 10-9- 106(2)(c) prohibits Sandy City from charging
any fees unless they are authorized generally by § 10-9-106(2). However, the storm drain
fee that Sandy City seeks to impose on the school district is not so authorized.
Sandy City argues that § 10-9-106(2)(c) was intended to prohibit only land use
12

development fees. However, there is no such restriction stated in that statute. The context
of the Act shows that it was intended to govern the broadest range of operation and use of
land possible. In fact, § 10-9-106(1) expressly states that it applies not merely in the context
of initial land use development fees for building permits and site plan approval, but to
"installing, constructing, operating, or otherwise using any area, land, or building situated
within that municipality..."

The School District uses its storm drains in the context of

"operating, or otherwise using" its land and buildings. Thus, the Act addresses a broader
range of issues than merely initial land use development fees; it also addresses all uses and
operations of land and buildings by a school district.
While § 17A-3-315 does not prohibit a municipality from assessing charges for
services and materials rendered merely because it has entered into contracts for such charges;
neither does it authorize a municipality to impose such fees on school districts.
The fee charged by Sandy City is not an impact fee because it does not comply with
the legal requirements of an impact fee. However, the statutory scheme set forth in §§ 10-9106 and 53A-20-108 provides that if Sandy City intends to charge for the impact of the
School District's use of its storm drains, it must charge an impact fee. Other fees are
prohibited by § 10-9- 106(2)(a). Sandy City should not be allowed to charge residents of the
Jordan School District who reside outside of Sandy City the cost to design and construct new
capital improvements for storm drain systems in Sandy City. One of the primary purposes
of § 10-9- 106(2)(c) is to prevent municipalities from spreading fees for capital improvements
13

to non-residents by charging such fees to school districts. Sandy City must charge only its
own residents to fund new construction and to make capital improvements to its storm drain
system.
Finally, Sandy City should not be granted authority to shut off water to schools in the
Jordan School District. The same reasons that prohibit a municipality from assessing a lien
against school district property apply to prohibit shutting off water to schools. Granting such
authority to Sandy City gives it authority to virtually shut down the schools in the Jordan
School District. Sections 10-9-106 and 53A-20-108 were enacted to prevent even the
possibility of a municipality having such authority.
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